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It is frequently argued that in a currency union the bal-
ances of payments of individual member countries are
superfluous, as there is only one currency, one exchange
rate, and – as was once thought – only one interest rate,
and external economic problems would only affect the
entire monetary union. In terms of European goals, this
concept is understandable but too ideal; in reality there
was less ‘convergence’ not more. Of course, the
European Monetary Union needs an overall balance of
payments, and it is supplied month after month, not
without errors and omissions that may already originate
in the national figures. In terms of external economic
relationships, the individual euro countries are indepen-
dent units; foreign trade and payments with other mem-
ber countries constitute as a rule less than 50 percent,
the remainder is with the rest of the world. The member
countries share the fate of a common exchange rate and
common European rules of trade, among other things.
The factors that are important for a country’s competi-
tiveness – production costs, distribution services, inno-
vations – are determined at the national level, and in
their business dealings with third countries they are
largely autonomous. It is interesting that the national
central banks also have largely autonomous command
over their own, not communitarised stock of gold and
foreign exchange. In the German case this implies, for
instance, that the Bundesbank has command over about
one third of German net foreign assets. The national
balances of payments in the Eurosystem should not be
disregarded as they reveal the potential and actual ten-
sions in the system that should not be overlooked.
Balance of payments disequilibria within the euro area
The current account of the euro area, viewed in its
entirety, appears to be more or less in equilibrium.
With one exception, from 2006 to 2010 (and in early
2011) the annual deficit amounted to only 10 to 30 bil-
lion euros. No major problems are discernible; this is
confirmed by the stable effective exchange rate. Reports
on the balance of payments of the European Monetary
Union, like those published in the Monthly Report of
the European Central Bank, are not spectacular. This
would be different were one to analyse a breakdown by
member country – here the economic disequilibrium
within the Monetary Union would be clearly revealed.
The near balance of payments equilibrium of the total
euro area hides the fact that it is the result of large
annual surpluses of some countries, especially Ger  -
many, and corresponding deficits of the others, espe-
cially the Southern member countries. During the peri-
od from 2006 to 2010, the annual current account sur-
plus of Germany alone vis-à-vis the rest of the world
averaged about 150 billion euros; the average deficit of
the other euro countries, which are combined here in an
overview, was somewhat higher. In these five years,
trade with the euro countries accounted for two thirds
of the entire German current account surplus, i.e. far
more than the corresponding share of the foreign trade
volume, which amounts to 40 percent. 
The balance of payments, a system of equations, 
no causal analysis
The balance of payments, like any balance, is con-
structed as an equation: the balance on current account
equals the balance on capital account. In other words,
with each surplus in the current account there is a cor-
respondingly high increase in net claims on foreign
countries. In the balance of payments statistics, current
and capital accounts are disaggregated by merchandise,
region, type of capital transactions, etc. in order to per-
mit an in-depth analysis, but by themselves they do not
supply an answer to the question of whether capital
exports are the cause of current account surpluses or
vice versa. Further, the attempt to assign certain capital
movements, like direct investment, to certain merchan-
dise groups, is controversial. In order to grasp the
causal relationship between capital movements and
cross-border flows of goods and services, various allo-
cations were made nonetheless. In the past, one relied * Former President of the Deutsche Bundesbank.on the distinction between autonomous and adjusting
capital flows, in the sense that ‘autonomous’ capital
flows promote exports and hence the current account
surplus, whereas ‘adjusting’ capital flows result as a
necessity, as the surplus of capital inflows from abroad
must arrive somewhere.
In a system of fixed exchange rates – to the dollar or
within the European Monetary System – it is the cen-
tral bank that ultimately has to absorb the surplus of
foreign exchange deriving from the current account
surplus and private net capital exports. In a system of
flexible exchange rates it is primarily the domestic
banking system that acquires short-term claims on
foreign countries. These flow to them quasi automati-
cally as part of cross-border payments, provided there
are no ‘autonomous’ capital exports. As the central
bank refrains from acting, it is up to the banks to
decide whether to keep short-term foreign deposits
and claims or exchange them for long-term assets. 
In transactions with third countries, the European
Monetary Union works in a system of flexible
exchange rates, i.e. without interventions in the for-
eign exchange market. A third form was developed for
balance of payments adjustment among member
countries. For one, the convergence in terms of cur-
rent accounts among the member countries has
reversed itself. In particular, the surplus position of
Germany has increased as have the deficits of many
member countries. The financing of these growing
balance of payments deficits within the group of
EMU member countries was also based on consider-
able ‘autonomous’ capital exports, especially purchas-
es of securities by Germany and other countries,
although until the outbreak of the financial crisis in
2007 interest rate spreads between the euro countries
were small. Furthermore, banks assumed a consider-
able portion of the adjusting capital flows. Thus,
short-term claims and loans of German banks to for-
eign countries reached 1,001 billion euros at the end
of 2007. But the growing distrust of banks regarding
partner banks, especially those abroad, after the out-
break of the crisis, led them to reduce these outstand-
ing short-term claims to 720 billion euros by the end
of 2010 (all figures refer to worldwide positions).
Available transaction figures for the euro countries
show that the focus was primarily on a reduction 
vis-à-vis the euro countries. This was combined with
an expansion of credit via the Target2 settlement sys-
tem. The more the payment inflows at the
Bundesbank from partner countries fell behind pay-
ments to domestic customers, the more rose the net
claims of the Bundesbank on the other member coun-
tries, to 338 billion euros by the end of 2010 and
462 billion euros in September 2011 compared to
18.3 billion euros at the end of 2006.
Looking at the German economy by itself, the
Bundesbank thus assumed the function of ‘balancing’
the payments vis-à-vis the rest of EMU, similar to the
way it did in the Bretton Woods System and the
European Monetary System, when the intervention
points were reached. But there was a major difference:
in the old system of fixed exchange rates, the
Bundesbank had to become active as soon as the
extent of these inevitable purchases appeared to
become indefensible from a monetary policy point of
view. It then asked the German government for an
appreciation or an exit from the system and did so
successfully in the Bretton Woods System in 1961,
1969 and 1973 and in the European Monetary System
(most recently in 1986 and 1992). 
Looking back, one notes that the inflows of foreign
exchange, which happened before the appreciation or
the exit from the Bretton Woods System, were large
but by far smaller than the increase in net claims in
the EMU’s Target2 system, as the latter amounted to
148 billion euros in 2010 and 124 billion euros in the
first nine month of 2011. In addition, the old fixed
exchange rate systems contained in part repayment
obligations that led to outflows of foreign exchange
resulting in the fact that the foreign exchange reserves
of the Bundesbank (excl. gold stocks) never exceeded
the D-mark equivalent of 100 billion euros, whereas
the net stocks of Target2 claims amounted to 462 bil-
lion euros at the end of September 2011. 
Another decisive difference to earlier foreign ex  change
regimes is that the Bundesbank is now part of the
Eurosystem without its own decision-making monetary
policy authority, and the monetary policy effect of the
growing Target2 claims is not comparable to the foreign
exchange purchases by the formerly independent
Bundesbank. By purchasing foreign exchange, the ‘old’
Bundesbank expanded the asset side of the balance
sheet and thereby also the monetary base (currency in
circulation plus deposits of the banks at the
Bundesbank); it could try, of course, to offset this by
other asset transactions. If today the Bundesbank
expands its claims on the other EMU countries (cen-
tralised at the European Central Bank), then it also cre-
ates central bank money. This is clearly shown in the
balance sheet of the Bundesbank, which amounted to
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679 billion euros at the end of August 2011; of this the
biggest amount was accounted for by net claims from
Target2 alone. This is not only the most important posi-
tion in the Bundesbank balance sheet but is also a major
part of the foreign assets of the Federal Republic, and
therefore not only ‘a statistical position’, as it has been
mentioned (Deutsche Bundesbank 2011).
But the monetary policy function is different from
that in the old Bundesbank system, in that an expan-
sion of Target2 claims more or less automatically
involves a reduction of claims arising from normal
refinancing transactions. These Bundesbank claims,
stemming from monetary policy operations with
German commercial banks, declined from 268 billion
euros at the end of 2007 – when the stock of Target2
claims was still relatively small – to 37.6 billion euros
in August 2011. Whether the German banks were dis-
advantaged by the reduction of their refinancing at
the Bundesbank to one sixth of the past amounts can-
not be discerned. During this time, the interest rates
on overnight deposits were as a rule below the refi-
nancing rates of the ECB, which is an indication of
excess liquidity. However, in the balance sheet of the
Bundesbank there was a massive change of debtors.
In place of the normal borrowers of the Bundesbank,
the domestic banks, we now find the partner countries
in the Eurosystem, primarily Greece, Ireland, Por-
tugal and Spain (the GIPS countries) (Deutsche
Bundesbank 2011).1 Formally, the claims of the
Bundesbank are directed at the ECB, which offsets the
positive and the negative balances of all member coun-
tries in its balance sheet.
Regarding the individual countries, Hans-Werner Sinn
and Timo Wollmershäuser (2011, 20) speak of “a relo-
cation of central bank credit from Germany to the
respective GIPS country”. Credit granted by the
Eurosystem as a whole to commercial banks is not lim-
ited by this. In lieu of the Bundesbank, the central
banks of the GIPS countries grant additional refinanc-
ing credits; these can, to the extent to which these funds
enter the payment flows with Germany, arrive at the
Bundesbank as claims in Target2 clearing transactions.
There is no crowding out of credit granted by the
Eurosystem, but a considerable change of debtors in
the total system. In place of German banks there are
now banks of the GIPS countries, whose creditworthi-
ness is often so poor that they can only solve their liq-
uidity problems with the help of their central banks
and this on the basis of a serious downgrading of the
demands on collateral. In the balance sheets of the
national central banks and in that of the ECB, as well
as the accompanying explanations, possible differences
in creditworthiness are not accounted for. The principle
seems to be ‘euro equals euro’. 
Keep the overall picture in mind
In addition to considering the relationship of the bal-
ance of payments and the intrinsic value of a central
bank balance sheet (a special concern of the author,
who co-signed the Bundesbank balance sheets for
22 years) it is important to evaluate the effect of this
kind of financing of balance of payments deficits on the
stability of the financial system. It is evident that for
countries with high balance of payments deficits, the
need to reduce the disequilibrium is dispensed with to
the extent to which the deficit may be automatically
financed via the Target2 system. In past years, normal
capital movements contributed to the financing of the
deficits; the government bonds of the GIPS countries
were sold abroad, but as soon as the risk involved
became obvious, this was only possible at high interest
rates and finally hardly at all. And, as discussed above,
the private banks withdrew from short-term financing.
Yet for some time, being able to finance deficits via
Target2 allowed the deficit countries to avoid the need
of adjustment, which for non-monetary-union coun-
tries is enforced by the market. The same applies to the
surplus countries, in which the increase of Target2
claims prevents an additional expansion of the money
supply through diminishing domestic credit creation
and thus additional domestic demand. Both effects sug-
gest limiting the creation of excessive balances in the
Target2 System, which originally was only supposed to
be a clearing system without lending, and/or introduc-
ing a punitive interest rate,2 a task that can only be tack-
led after the current turbulences have abated.
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